

THE RELEVANCE AND OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF THE MILITARY
IN JAMAICA IN THE CURRENT AND EMERGING
GEO-SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE RELEVANCE AND OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF THE MILITARY IN
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ENVIRONMENT,
by Major Rocky R. MEADE.

In most democratic countries that are not engaged in conflict one can expect debates regarding the amount of the gross domestic product (GDP) that is spent on national security. The issue is even more significant in small states with limited resources. The Jamaican military is occasionally the subject of such debates. The arguments raised against expenditure on an active military force, as opposed to the police force, include the view that there is no apparent conventional external threat, while the internal police-type tasks are increasing.

This study considers current and emerging threats to determine what capabilities are required to face them. Case studies of Costa Rica, Iceland, Singapore and the Eastern Caribbean States, are used to determine some of the options available for small-state security linked to the issue of sovereignty. Interviews of both military and nonmilitary experts on national security issues provide additional data for comparison and contrast. The dissertation concludes with recommendations for retaining the military's distinct character, with a reduced regular/active force structure, though not necessarily less personnel, and a significantly larger reserve component. The main theme is that Jamaica cannot afford to be complacent because the nature of security threats globally is evolving.

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ACRONYMS

ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CARICOM	Caribbean Community: A grouping of fifteen, majority English-speaking, countries bordered by the Caribbean Sea that cooperates primarily on economic and foreign policy issues
CARIFTA	Caribbean Free Trade Area: A Caribbean grouping that preceded CARICOM
CJCSC	Caribbean Junior Command and Staff Course
CNS	Chief of the National Security Staff (proposed)
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act (US)
FAR	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba
FMS	Foreign Military Sales (US)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMET	International Military Education and Training (US)
JCF	Jamaica Constabulary Force: The Jamaican national police force
JDF	Jamaica Defence Force: The current Jamaican military including the Coast Guard
MAP	Military Assistance Program (US)
MIL	The military group of interviewees
MNS	Ministry of National Security (Jamaica)
MOH	Ministry of Health (Jamaica)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NONMIL	The nonmilitary group of interviewees

ODP	See ODPEM
ODPEM	Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (Jamaica)
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
OPEN	Organismo Popular de Emergencies Nacionales or the Organization for National Emergencies (Costa Rica)
PS	Permanent Secretary
RSS	Regional Security System (Eastern Caribbean Countries)
SAF	Singapore Armed Forces
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
STRATFOR	Strategic Forecasting: Private Providers of Global Intelligence
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
USIA	United States Information Agency

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Whatever you can't defend doesn't belong to you. (2000, 42)

Chong Yu Meng, *Defending Singapore in the 21st Century*

In a small state with limited resources, coupled with a national budget the majority of which (approximately 60 percent) goes to servicing debt; it is not surprising that some citizens may seek to identify areas of possibly unnecessary or excessive expenditure. Jamaica is one such state and the military is occasionally the subject of such reviews. Several related issues have been informally discussed indicating that this is of concern to some Jamaicans. The arguments raised include the view that there is no apparent conventional external threat to the country since the end of the Cold War. Additionally, they argue, if there was an external threat, the brigade-sized Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) would not be able to cope without external assistance, most likely from other Commonwealth countries or the United States of America (US). Some take the view that the JDF is necessary only for a number of internal roles. Others argue that what is needed for those roles is a larger police force, not a military. While these discussions are taking place the currently employed JDF soldiers will tell you that they feel overworked. This raises a number of questions not the least of which is, if there is no role for the military, how are the perceived "overworked" soldiers being employed?

Research Questions

There is need for a more formal examination of the issues than has occurred so far. This research project is therefore designed to determine what sort of military force, if

any, is needed in Jamaica. The primary research questions that are addressed are as follows:

1. What, if anything, makes a Jamaican military organization relevant in the current and emerging geo-security environment?
2. If relevant, what capabilities do the Jamaican military need?
3. What optimal structure should the Jamaican military have?

Secondary questions would include: the nature of the current and future national security threats, if any; the other issues/challenges that may make the military relevant for Jamaica, the Caribbean region and internationally; the roles of present JDF; whether these roles are still relevant and will be relevant in the future; can these be adequately performed by a nonmilitary or paramilitary organization; what are the advantages and disadvantages of each; how would they be structured and how do some other small states deal with these issues? It should be noted that Jamaica is not the only country facing these types of issues. For example, “Mexico's new administration and security institutions face daunting challenges [that are] of concern to the United States and other nations in the region” (Turbiville 2001, 1).

Significance of the Research

If the military in Jamaica must be reviewed for relevance, then it is best that it be examined internally before an external committee is tasked by the government to do so. Reviews of the performance of the JDF have been done in the past, the most recent by KPMG Accounting in 1998. However, none so far has been given terms of reference that specifically question the relevance of the Force. The JDF must anticipate this possibility and be proactive. It must critically examine and determine what future viable military

roles there are and what structure would be optimally required to fulfill them. This research may offer a step of this process.

Definitions

Some of the key terms that should be clearly understood in order for the arguments of the dissertation to be accurately interpreted are defined as follows:

1. Jamaican Military: A Jamaican government funded and controlled armed organization trained and equipped for, but not exclusively, armed combat. The existing Jamaican military organization is the JDF. The structure, current roles and budget are presented in a subsequent section of this chapter.

2. Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF): The national police force of approximately 7,500, which accounts for more than 55 percent of the national security and justice budget (table 1, page 6).

3. The Minister of Defence: The chairman of the Defence Board and effectively the Commander in Chief of the JDF. The Prime Minister holds this post.

4. The Minister of National Security: The government appointee whose job includes the administration of the JDF, JCF and the Correctional Services.

5. Caribbean Community: Normally referred to as CARICOM, this is a grouping of fifteen, majority English-speaking, countries bordered by the Caribbean Sea. It was first established as the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) in 1973 and cooperates on economic and foreign policy. There is no formal defense/security agreement.

Assumptions

A number of assumptions will be necessary in order to limit the scope of this analysis. These assumptions are not limited to but include the following:

1. The economic difficulties and budgetary constraints in Jamaica will continue to some extent for the foreseeable future.

2. Major Commonwealth of Nations countries such as the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada will continue to have some influence on and be willing to support small states including those in the Caribbean region.

3. The US will continue to be a superpower or at least a major power broker with significant influence regionally and globally in the medium to long term.

4. Jamaica will continue to be an active and influential participant in CARICOM. The effect and necessary capabilities will emerge in the subsequent discussions.

5. The risk of terrorist activities globally and the related security concerns will exist for the foreseeable future.

Limitations/Delimitations

The limitations and delimitations are included to assist in defining the scope of the research project in terms of what will be covered and to make explicit what potentially related matters will be excluded. The major catalyst for the debate on the relevance of a Jamaican military organization is what the country can afford to spend on it, based on the limited availability of resources for numerous public services in Jamaica. The dissertation will not be able to examine in any detail the causes of or solutions for the economic difficulties. Additionally, the precise financial implications of any new or restructured organization are beyond the scope of this research. The research will focus primarily on Jamaica, but will include significant external influences. These will be restricted to CARICOM, Costa Rica, Cuba, Iceland, Singapore, the UK and the US, with the exception of passing references to other countries where relevant. Constabulary force

(police) roles will be examined only to the extent that they may influence decisions about the military.

Present Roles, Structure and Budget of the JDF

The present structure of the JDF serves to execute a wide span of direct and indirect security issues ranging from defense of the nation to search and rescue. The detailed roles are as follows:

1. Defense of the Nation
2. Aid to the civil powers namely:
 - a. Support to the JCF in maintaining law and order
 - b. To take military action when necessary to restore law and order
3. Aid to the civil authorities namely:
 - a. To assist in the maintenance of essential services
 - b. Assistance and protection in the event of disasters or emergencies
 - c. Assistance to government sponsored development programs
4. Maintenance of law enforcement, safety and environmental protection duties in Jamaica's maritime areas of jurisdiction
5. Military ceremonial
6. Search and rescue by land, air and sea
7. Participation in overseas operations and exercises in order to protect the interests of Jamaica and its Allies, including:
 - a. Assistance to Caribbean countries, when necessary and so requested, to restore law and order, and in the event of a disaster in such countries to provide assistance and protection for the civil population, when requested.

b. United Nations and International Peacekeeping duties

To execute these roles the JDF has a personnel establishment of 3,900 including 900 in the National Reserves and a budget of less than 0.5 percent of GDP. The structure represents a brigade formation with three infantry battalions, a support battalion, an engineer battalion, an air wing and a coast guard. The budget can be contrasted with the world average of 2.6 percent of GDP (SIPRI 2002, chapter 6). In 1998 it was reduced to less than 20 percent of the total expenditure on national security and justice in Jamaica as shown in table 1.

Table 1. Distribution of the National Security and Justice Budget 1990-98 (%).

Year	Military	Police	Courts	Prisons
1990	29.0	54.0	8.0	9.0
1992	30.0	58.0	5.0	7.0
1994	27.0	53.0	11.0	9.0
1996	27.3	51.4	10.8	10.5
1998	18.8	56.6	12.7	11.9

Source: *The Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica* (quoted in Harriott 2002, 9).

Note: Based on actual expenditures on security services and the criminal justice system.

Brief Overview of the Literature

Notwithstanding the relatively extensive informal discussions regarding the relevance of the JDF, there is a dearth of publications on the issue. Some publications on internal security indirectly address the issue of the role of the military. Harriott (2002), after examining the various issues faced by the security forces, but particularly the JCF, suggests that Jamaica would be better served by having a larger constabulary force and a significantly smaller professional military force as the core of a national guard of

reservists. Harriott's focus was on a more effective constabulary force and therefore he probably did not consider the precise structural adjustments that the required military capabilities would imply. He also appears to have been misinformed on the size of the present regular/active force in Jamaica. His quote of 4,500 is 50 percent more than the actual figure. That probably explains his conclusion that the active military is excessively large for Jamaica's circumstances.

Roper (2001) looked more directly at issues affecting the military in his discussion of the viability of combining military and constabulary forces in small developing states. He concludes that, although there is much to be gained economically by amalgamation, there is also much potential for stability to be lost by such a change. His concern with stability relates partially to the issue of the police themselves taking action that may adversely affect national security. A more detailed treatment of the applicable literature is presented in appendix A.

Methodological Overview

Evidence for the research was obtained primarily through qualitative content analyses of data in the literature. This includes an examination of the approach other similar small states take regarding similar issues. Four case studies of small states provide this data. The findings of the research are complemented by interviews of selected experts and specialists in Jamaican strategic security issues. The primary purpose of the interview data is to ensure that all the issues that the experts deem relevant are considered. The methodological details are discussed in appendix B and the interview questionnaire is presented at appendix C.

Summary and Outline

This chapter outlined the background issues that led to the questions that this research is aimed at addressing. The nature of the threat to Jamaica's national security appears to be changing and the ability to economically support a military organization is proving to be increasingly difficult. This is especially so with approximately 60 percent of the budget allocated to repay the national debt. Chapter 2 examines more carefully the current and emerging security environment, focusing on threats and challenges in Jamaica, regionally and internationally. Four case studies of other small states, Costa Rica, the Eastern Caribbean Islands, Iceland and Singapore are presented in chapter 3. The need for and the optimal structure of a military organization in such an environment, including a comparative analysis of the evidence from the previous chapters and the data from the interviews are presented in chapter 4. The concluding discussion appears in chapter 5. A review of the applicable literature and the methodology employed are presented as Appendices A and B, respectively.

CHAPTER 2

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THREATS AND CHALLENGES

This chapter seeks to determine the nature of the security threat affecting Jamaica currently and/or with the potential to influence the Jamaican situation in the future. Regional and international issues that may have an effect on Jamaica are included in the discussion. It covers various external and internal threats and challenges, which, it concludes, Jamaica should not ignore, even with economic difficulties.

External Threats

One of the main arguments against a standing military or for a smaller standing military is that there is no current external threat to Jamaica since the end of the Cold War (Harriott 2002, 4). Most of those who make this claim are actually referring to the perceived lack of a likely conventional military external threat at this time. However, Jamaica does face external threats that include terrorism and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) infringement. Drug and arms trafficking, though discussed under the internal threats, have external sources. Threats to other countries in the Caribbean are also likely to have an impact on Jamaica. Although threats are examined in this chapter as a precursor to determining the capabilities required, it is a capabilities-based approach that is being used for the analysis. That is, an examination of various types of threats that might be faced and ensuring available capability to counter all, including the unlikely.

Terrorism

The attention of most of the world is now focused on international terrorism. This is almost unavoidably so since the US was subject to acts of terrorism in September 2001.

Jamaica could arguably face acts of terror based on its geographical and political/ideological closeness to the US, including its support for the US retaliation against the perpetrators. However, before the discussion continues, the meaning of the term terrorism should be made more explicit.

Terrorism Defined

With the US and many of its allies declaring war on international terrorism, one could get the impression that terrorism is an identifiable enemy, whose defeat is also similarly identifiable. However, as the war on terrorism progresses it is becoming less clear what the tangible goal of an antiterrorism campaign should be. Is it the defeat of Al Queda, the defeat all the US identified members of the Axis of Evil, or something else? One wide definition of terrorism is the “unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons” (*American Heritage Dictionary*, 1996). A slightly more restricted definition is that terrorism “means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (*U.S. Code Title 10*, Section 2656f). This excludes from the definition of terrorism acts against persons actually engaged in combat. Boaz Ganor finds this definition insufficient to distinguish between terrorism and guerrilla tactics and suggests instead that terrorism, which is illegitimate, is “the deliberate use of violence against civilians in order to attain political, ideological and religious aims” (Ganor 2001, 1). For him, “the deliberate use of violence against military and security personnel” is guerrilla warfare and legitimate (Ganor 2001, 1).

One consistent point in these views is that terrorism is a *method* of attempting to achieve one's ends; it is not an end itself, nor is it an entity. When war is declared on terrorism the most that it can mean is a war against those that historically and/or currently use terrorist methodology, with the implicit hope that success in that war will discourage its future use. According to the *US Code*, international terrorism means "terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country" (*U.S. Code Title 10*, Section 2656f). It could therefore be characterized as terrorism across international borders.

Finally, this methodology may be applied by small groups or individuals. It was encouraging to see that although the definitions indicated typical goals, they did not limit the possible goals. Too often definitions are limited by examples we have already witnessed, without an allowance being made for expansion beyond those examples. In this case, the goals of those using terrorism do not need be limited only to the ideological and political. Terrorism is a method of conflict that best suits those that are faced with an opponent with significantly more resources and is otherwise insurmountable. This tends to be a government, and typically when governments are challenged the goals tend to be political and/or ideological. However, there are numerous historical examples of conventional warfare being engaged for what are ultimately economic reasons. It should stand to reason, therefore, that the terrorism methodology could also be used for economic reasons as the net desired effect. A superempowered individual or small nongovernment group could seek to obtain or influence political power for financial gain. A superempowered individual is one with access to resources, typically through technological advancement, that are normally only available to states (Friedman 2000, 14).

With this definition of terrorism in mind, are the Caribbean Islands likely to be subject to terrorism and if so from what sources? One possible source is the same being faced by the US and other Western countries at the moment; another is the criminal elements, local and international, particularly the drug dealer.

Terrorism against the West

Jamaica could face terrorist acts as a result of its political, ideological and geographical closeness to the US. Jamaica is clearly a part of the Western civilization. The country is run by a secular government and the religious population is predominantly Christian. If Huntington (1993) is correct that a clash between Western and Islamic-Confucian civilizations is inevitable,¹ then will the Caribbean be exempt? One could expect that if the Western civilization is being targeted, then it would be the real or perceived lead country and/or the major power brokers that would be targeted. One might not expect that there is much to be gained by targeting small countries with arguably no significant influence on the general posture of the civilization of which they are a part. However, they could be targeted if they are more easily accessible and if such attacks are clearly identified as a part of the larger war against the West. It should be noted that the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) as well as several individual Caribbean countries, including Jamaica, expressed solidarity with the US (CARICOM 2001) and support to the United Nations (UN) for the declared war on terrorism (Durrant 2001).

Targeting of Jamaica could also provide an indirect means of inflicting terror on the US population. Only European tourists compete with American tourists for the number of visits to Jamaica. It is not inconceivable that US visitors to the Jamaica could be targeted by those hoping to drive fear into the American people. For some time after

the September 2001 attack, Americans were flying less frequently, causing financial difficulties for the airlines. If popular American tourist vacation spots were targeted for US citizens, then that would also increase the fear factor.

Countries like Jamaica could also be targeted if they are geographically close enough to provide a convenient launch pad to the major power being targeted. As is discussed below, the drug dealers find a number of Caribbean countries including Jamaica to be feasible transshipment points, so too may persons wishing to perpetrate terrorist activities. One could argue that only Cuba, in the Caribbean, is likely to voluntarily provide a launch pad for US targets, being closer and not US-friendly. However, that could be exactly the reason it may not be chosen since it would be subject to more scrutiny by the US authorities. The bigger concern here is the possible involuntary use of other Caribbean territories whether by invasion or more likely infiltration. Once an assault on the US mainland is launched, there could be significant disruptions in the Caribbean country used as a base, not to mention the possible US response if collusion is suspected. Jamaica would be expected to have arrangements in place to guard against such a possibility. U.S. security strategists are now open to more carefully scrutinizing peripheral geographies and to respecting the dangers that may emanate from them (Mendel 2002, 8). If countries are not putting preventative options in place, it could be seen as supporting terrorism (US Department of Defense 2000, 4). Jamaica is not exempt.

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Encroachment

It is not only the drug dealers that illegally use Caribbean waters for their personal benefit. Fishermen from neighboring countries regularly seek to exploit the fertile

offshore fishing banks in the Caribbean. Jamaica has had a number of confrontations, particularly with Honduras, regarding illegal fishing at its Pedro and Morant Cays. This is of major concern as it is a threat to the fragile economy of Jamaica. The fishermen from the offending countries usually have large trawlers that harvest marine life at a much greater rate than can the local Jamaican fishermen and which is also harmful to the continued survival of many marine species. There is hardly a need to justify Jamaica's responsibility to defend its EEZ.

The Cuban Timebomb

Demarest (2001) notes that the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of Cuba would be the center of gravity for any transitional change in Cuba. The FAR would also be the center of gravity that would be targeted in any conflict-based regime change. Cuba is only 90 miles from Jamaica and therefore any significant conflicts in Cuba would have implications for Jamaica. The threat of a violent regime change increases year by year, not necessarily from US supported groups, but from Cuban exiles determined to regain their homeland, and from the possibility of regime fracture during any leadership transition. Armed opportunism by international criminal organizations or violent assertion by rogue or disaffected military factions are also possibilities.

Additionally, in the possible fight for power after Fidel Castro, the English-speaking Caribbean could be drawn in due to existing cultural and the increasing linguistic linkages. Fidel Castro, apparently aware of the divisiveness of emphasizing an Hispanic identity for Cuba, declared in 1976 that Cuba is a "Latin African" rather than Latin American nation. More recently, in 1999, he reasserted that "the Caribbean people of African origin are a part of Our America" (quoted in Girvan 2001, 3). Even in the face

of the US embargo, Jamaica and many other Caribbean countries have maintained fairly consistent diplomatic and economic links with Cuba. It may be very difficult to avoid getting involved in any conflict within or aimed at Cuba. Can we say that no matter how severe the problems of others, no Jamaican expedition is justified?

Threats to CARICOM Partners

The answer to the terminating question in the previous section should lead most to the view that in considering security issues affecting Jamaica it is not sufficient to examine only those concerns that directly threaten Jamaica. Jamaica is a member of CARICOM, and even without this umbrella body the country would still take an interest in the security of its neighbors. During the political crisis in Grenada in 1983, Jamaica was one of the lead countries to send troops to answer the call of its neighbor in distress. Again, when political uncertainty loomed in Haiti, Jamaica contributed soldiers to a CARICOM battalion that went in to assist. CARICOM is not a political union and there is no official military component, although there are significant debates arguing for one (Bishop, 2002 and Dillon, 2001). However, the countries of CARICOM and the wider Caribbean have demonstrated more than once their willingness and sense of obligation to respond to the security needs of their neighbors.

At least three Caribbean countries, Belize, Guyana and Suriname, have outstanding territorial disputes. Sylvestre (1995) points out that on at least a few occasions Guatemala only avoided invading Belize because of the then presence of British troops there. Now that the British troops are out, it is arguable that it is Belize's membership in CARICOM that presently keeps Guatemala at bay. If a message is sent suggesting that some of the larger countries in the Caribbean have determined that there

is no external threat and therefore reduce or demobilize their military, then this may be seen as an open invitation by Guatemala. This would also impact Guyana and its disputes with Venezuela and Suriname.

Internal Threats and Challenges

There is very little disagreement, in the formal and informal debates in Jamaica, regarding the nature of the internal threats and challenges. In fact the stronger arguments against the maintenance of an active military force are based on the view that the internal threats and challenges have more significant implications for the peaceful existence of Jamaicans than do any external threat. There is no need to justify the view that these challenges exist. However, to consider the optimal security system required for Jamaica and not just whether or not the present JDF should be retained, it is useful to have at least a brief discussion of these internal challenges, which should affect the outcome. The issues discussed are; criminal insurgency, civil disorder and natural disasters.

Drug Trafficking and Criminal Insurgency

After the end of the Cold War one of the main concerns of the US regarding the Caribbean was drug trafficking. Now even with the war against terrorism taking center stage, the US still has a security interest in keeping hard drugs out of the country. The implications for Jamaica are even more significant as the drug traffickers often bring guns into the island, either to help protect their *turf* or to trade them for services rendered by Jamaican residents to facilitate the drug trade. This then translates into a major internal security problem. There is also the possible insurgent/terrorist component of this threat to the island's security.

Although the source of drugs and arms are external, illegal trafficking of these items is considered under internal threats due to the close links with internal criminal activities (Harriott 2002, 5). The links are in a number of forms including arms being supplied to local gangs by the drug dealers, internal violence associated with the drug trade and the corruption of some Jamaican citizens and public officials in particular by the drug dealers. However, the only marketable illegal drug that is produced in Jamaica is marijuana. All of the hard-drugs, such as cocaine, heroine and their derivates that are traded in or through Jamaica, originate with external criminal organizations.

There is a view that, these criminal organizations are not necessarily seeking political power as an end in itself, nor have any ideological cause, but simply want to be allowed to carry out their criminal activities without interference. However, they do use terrorist methods to protect their interests. There is another view that they are in fact terrorists with military and political goals ultimately seeking impunity from taxation and the law (Demarest 2002, 5). They drive fear into the population to preclude information being passed to the authorities and for the people to join in the obstruction of the government agents. In Jamaica there was one significant example recently in which a suspected criminal leader was detained by the police and people from his community staged protests. The action did not stop until the police allowed the detainee to address the crowd and ask them to disperse. The subtle implication of this police action provides fairly clear indication that criminals are making ground in eroding the power of the government. The point is that even if it is not the direct aim of the criminal elements to have an effect on the government, the effect of their violent actions against civilians is undermining the authority of the government's agents and hence the government.

It is nonetheless important to distinguish between the threat from the external drug sources and the internal criminal elements. While recognizing criminal-based insurgency possibilities, drugs are not linked to all criminal activity. Different solution methodologies may be required for criminal activity linked to externally-sourced drug trafficking and for non drug-based internal criminal insurgency. The term “criminal insurgency” is used to capture Lyon’s (2002) expansion of the insurgency goals to include “criminal.” The idea being that criminals, though not necessarily seeking political power, may undermine the government to improve their financial gain either directly or through effective impunity from taxation. Some of them do have the means to do so. The criminal mastermind could have incomes that exceed those of small countries. Whatever the personal goals of the criminals, the potential threat to the government is relevant.

Civil Disorder

Civil disorder, in this context, refers to organized or spontaneous activities that disrupt or have the potential to disrupt normal activities. This category subsumes all forms of violence and disorder not associated with direct criminal motives. It therefore includes mass demonstrations/riots, political conflicts and social violence, which are listed as separate threats by Harriott (2002, table 4, see appendix A). In 1999, there were three continuous days of island wide riots in Jamaica as a result of an attempt to increase the tax on petroleum products. It took the combined efforts of the police and the military, including the military reserve, to bring the situation under control.

Natural Disasters and Emergencies

Jamaica is at risk from earthquakes, hurricanes and flooding. The country has experienced numerous tremors, with the most significant being in 1692, 1907 and 1993.

Flash flooding and hurricanes are annual phenomena in the region. In addition to Jamaica's need to be prepared to manage the effects of hurricanes striking the country, there is an agreement to assist other countries in the Caribbean that may be affected. In addition to national emergencies there is also a need for a search and rescue role. Fishermen regularly go missing at sea and hikers in the mountains. Air and sea assets are vital in these circumstances. Harriott (2002, 7) acknowledges that the military has a significant disaster management role. He mentions that the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM) and the military are jointly responsible for the management of these disasters. However, it should be noted that the ODPEM is effectively a coordination agency. It has no significant resources of its own. Other agencies, primarily the military, are co-opted in the event of a national emergency.

Concluding Comments

Although the US can be said to have the best military in the world, there was clearly insufficient attention paid to the defense of its country before 2001. For the US, the reason for the lack of adequate defense is not a perception of there being no external threat, but rather, it was the perception that no country would dare to challenge the US on its own soil. This was no doubt fuelled by the apparent deterrent effect of the fact that the US is the only country that can retaliate decisively anywhere in the world.

The events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated that this was a miscalculation on the part of the US, because, even if it is true that no country would attack them with conventional means, it is obviously not true of superempowered individuals and certainly not true of nonconventional means of warfare. The US was complacent for decades and as a result had, at a minimum, its ego significantly bruised by a superempowered

individual. The US is now spending billions to reorganize its security system with significant attention and resources being dedicated to “homeland” security.

One could argue that the US should have known and planned better since it has so many acknowledged and potential enemies. That may be true. However, the more significant point here is that regardless of the realities of the American security situation, it had reason to believe that there was no need for direct defense of the homeland. The US military was being maintained not to protect the US directly, but to protect US interests by securing those countries that fall within the expanded and externalized identity of the US. All countries and even individuals should have externalized identities, based not only on historical movements and associations, but also on common norms. However, whatever the justification for the previous policies, the point is that notwithstanding the available evidence, the American people in general and their successive governments in particular, did not perceive any significant threat to the US mainland and learned the error of that perception in September 2001.

The security situation for Jamaica is almost directly opposite, with it having almost no offensive and very insignificant defensive military capabilities. However, the possible resultant effect could be similar to that which affected the US. If based on the low probability of traditional forms of threat, Jamaica fails to prepare, the result might be devastating. Should it take an actual attack for Jamaica to focus on its defense? When it is said that Jamaica has no external threat, it can only be referring to a conventional military threat from another country. As was argued, in this paper, such a view is at a minimum shortsighted and maybe even irresponsible. Jamaica does face external threats that, at a minimum, include terrorism, regional destabilization and EEZ infringement.

The ability to face conventional military threats should not be totally ignored. In addition to the desirability of Jamaica being prepared to assist with convention threats to countries in the region, the low probability of Jamaica being targeted does not make it impossible. Jamaica does not have to be a primary target for it to be attacked, as was indicated in the section on the Cuban situation. Further support for the possibility of Jamaica being targeted as a means to another end, is the reported 1962 proposal by the US military leadership to target Jamaica and another Commonwealth country, with the view that “by secretly attacking them and then falsely blaming Cuba, the United States could lure England into the war against Castro” (Bramford 2001, 89). This was never actioned and General Lemnitzer, the Joint Chiefs Chairman was replaced, but the point is that Jamaica should avoid complacency and be prepared for the unexpected.

¹There have been some rebuttals of Huntington’s (1993) thesis including Hunter’s (1998) *The Future of Islam and the West*, in which she asserts that a clash between Islamic and Western civilizations, though possible, is not inevitable.

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY APPROACHES

As indicated in the chapter 1, some of the arguments put forward against Jamaica maintaining an active military force include the issues of the country's small size and limited resources. In exploring these arguments it is useful to first consider how other small nations approach the issue of national security, including cases where they specifically exclude military forces of their own. The cases that are considered are Costa Rica whose constitution specifically bans military forces; Iceland that relies on the US and NATO for defense; the Eastern Caribbean States that are even smaller than Jamaica; and Singapore that provides its own very strong defense force.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica is located on the strip of Central America linking Nicaragua with Panama (see figure 1). Its land mass is approximately 50,000 square kilometers, which is about five times the size of Jamaica. However, the population is more comparable with Jamaica's at approximately 3.6 million versus 2.7 million (*CIA World Factbook 2002*).



Figure 1. Map of Costa Rica. *Source: World Sites Atlas* (document online, available at <http://www.sitesatlas.com/Maps/Maps/306.htm>)

It is unique in the Americas and probably in the world as a country that not only does not have a military force, but constitutionally prohibits the organization of military forces. Even neutral countries such as Switzerland maintain militaries, just in case their neutrality is not respected at some point. This case study first examines the relevant historical details that led to the banning of military forces in Costa Rica. It then looks at the structure including roles, training and equipment employed in their existing security system, which is, on the face of it, based on policing organizations. The aim is to make a determination as to whether Costa Rica is actually managing without military forces or are their police forces or elements thereof just militaries in police clothing.

Historical Setting

In 1949, following a brief civil war, the Costa Rican constitution was amended to prohibit the future organization of military forces there. According to Harold Nelson, the country never had a strong martial tradition in its history and therefore it was with the wide approval of its citizens that the abolition of the military was effected (Nelson 1983, 257). From the Spanish colonial period, the role of the soldier was relatively insignificant since Spain had no significant interests there to protect and the primarily farming population was not particularly concerned with issues outside its local communities. Even after independence in 1821, the Costa Rican military was popular at only one point in the country's history when, in 1856 it had a successful war in Nicaragua. However, two periods of military dictatorship from 1870 to 1882 and 1917 to 1918 helped to erase the heroic image it enjoyed after the war.

After the Congress annulled the elections of 1948, which were surprisingly won by the opposition, Jose Figueres launched his National War of Liberation with hundreds

of volunteers. Within a few weeks they defeated the small and poorly trained government forces, but a couple of thousand lives were lost in the process. In December of the same year, Figueres announced that the army would be disbanded not only because they were ineffective in the period leading up to the civil war, but also because there was the suspicion that making them more professional and better equipped would produce a potential threat to the government. Within a year the constitutional details were effected to make the prohibition of the military into law. All security issues were to be handled by the police forces.

Structure of the Security Forces

The policing system that was organized to replace the military consisted of nonprofessionals who were appointed based on political inclinations and were typically newly appointed after each election (Nelson 1983, 243). It, however, retained the military rank structures and other military organizational architecture such as companies and battalions. The original structure included the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) a national constabulary force and the smaller Guardia de Asistencia Rural (Rural Assistance Guard). A reserve force called the Organismo Popular de Emergencias Nacionales (OPEN) or the Organization for National Emergencies was subsequently created in 1982. The initial forces originally functioned under different ministries, but since 1996 they have all been brought under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior, Police and Public Security, as shown in figure 2. The complete security system includes approximately 20,000 personnel, performing ground security, law enforcement, counternarcotics, and national security functions, particularly border patrols.




Figure 2. Security Structure of Costa Rica, 2003. Source: Karen C. Gaffin, *Security Structure of Costa Rica* (Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2003)

The Civil Guard

The core of the Costa Rican security system is the Civil Guard, which has responsibility nationally for law and order particularly in the cities and for security along its borders. It consists of approximately 4,300 personnel organized into eight operational units in the capital city including two new (Condor and Cobra) battalions added in 1982; six provincial commands and three area commands that were also incorporated in the 1982 restructuring; and seven specialized units, including air and sea units. The latter is actually more like a coast guard than a naval unit.

Rural Assistance Guard

Supplementing the Civil Guard in the rural areas is the Rural Assistance Guard, previously referred to as the Town and Village Police. The strength of the Rural Guard is approximately 3,000 personnel. Although the Rural Guardsmen's duties often extend beyond basic policing, they have never been called upon to repel external aggression as was the Civil Guard (Nelson 1983, 271).

Air, Sea and Other Specialist Forces

The Coast Guard has a personnel-strength of about 100 and a fleet of four 65-foot and one 100-foot patrol boat, plus seventeen smaller boats that are operated on the rivers. The air unit has about 100 personnel and a fleet that includes several light Piper fixedwing aircraft and helicopters. The other specialist units are represented in the organizational chart in figure 2.

Reserve Force - OPEN

One of the more significant acts during the move to improve the capabilities of the security forces in 1982 was the formation of the 10,000 strong reserve force, OPEN.

This was significant because that was about the size of all the then existing security elements combined. The Public Security Minister at the time tried to make clear the purpose of the reserve force when he made the statement that OPEN “is the backbone that will enable us to smash any attempt to destabilize the democratic regime” (as quoted in Nelson 1983, 269).

Training and Equipment

The primary training institution for the security forces in Costa Rica is the Francisco J. Orlich National Police School. The training concept is for the various companies of the Civil Guard in particular to rotate through the school for ongoing training. The syllabus at the school is designed to emphasize law enforcement as opposed to military competence. However, significant numbers of Costa Rican personnel and units have been trained by Panamanian and US instructors. These instructors are primarily from military schools and not police academies.

The US International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has sponsored the training of several hundred Costa Rican Officers in the US. Many were also trained at the United States Army School of the Americas at Fort Gulick in Panama. In fact, it is interesting that the US Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) prohibits the use of security-assistance funds, such as IMET, to train, advise or offer financial support to foreign police forces, prisons, internal intelligence programs or other law enforcement forces (*US FAA*, Section 660). However, a special exception was made by the US Congress in the case of Costa Rica because the Civil Guard was viewed as having primarily military responsibilities. Also significant to the decision is the fact that Costa

Rica is seen as a “model of democracy and political stability in the region” (US Department of State, 1999).

Most of the weapons and equipment in the Costa Rican inventory were received from the US (Nelson 1983, 272). It received millions of US dollars of arms and equipment through the US Military Assistance Program (MAP) and has purchased additional items through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, including the UH-1H helicopter (US Department of State, 1997). Costa Rica has also received, through grants and purchases, military equipment from other countries such as Panama, Venezuela, Israel, South Korea and Taiwan.

Costa Rica constitutionally abolished its military because it was seen as ineffective in the years leading up to 1948, but more important, because of fears of military coups. This was also the reason the previous military force was kept small and poorly trained. The Costa Ricans were confident that a system of police forces was sufficient to handle their security issues. Over time Costa Rican “police”, primarily the Civil Guard, has been forced to take on duties that go well beyond the maintenance of law and order and more towards national security. The structure, training and equipment of the Costa Rican security forces, and the Civil Guard in particular, suggests that irrespective of what they are called, they are prepared for and are executing traditional military duties. This is also acknowledged by their greatest benefactor, the US Congress. The next case study considers an independent country with apparently no input to its national security.

Iceland

Like Costa Rica, Iceland is a country that prefers not to establish military forces. However, unlike Costa Rica, Iceland does not even provide for its own security with forces of another name, but instead, leaves it entirely up to foreign countries. This raises issues of the strategic interest that the foreign country must have, to fully take on this role and to what extent is the sovereignty of Iceland affected.

Historical Setting

Iceland is an island located northwest of the UK in the North Atlantic Ocean and is approximately twice the size of Costa Rica at 100,250 square kilometers (figure 3). The first Europeans to settle the island were Norwegians, Scots and Irish, during the late 9th and 10th centuries. They established the world's oldest functioning legislative assembly, the Althing, in 930. They were subsequently ruled by Norway and Denmark. Iceland attained limited self rule in 1874, maintaining allegiance to the Danish Monarch.



Figure 3. Iceland in relation to the UK. *Source: World Sites Atlas* (document online, available at <http://www.sitesatlas.com/Maps/Maps/Europe.htm>, 2000).

When Germany invaded Denmark in 1940, the Icelandic parliament took over the executive powers of the Danish King. The insular-minded Icelanders were not concerned about their security, but the British and American leaders saw too much strategic value in the island to leave it undefended (Donovan 1992, 6). The British established a garrison there, but as World War Two progressed, the responsibility became overwhelming and Prime Minister Churchill asked President Roosevelt to provide American troops as replacements. This was effected with the approval of the Icelanders for the period of the war.

Structure of the Security Forces

In 1949 Iceland joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but argued that there was no need for Iceland to establish its own armed forces. It also argued initially that there was no need to have foreign troops stationed in the country during peacetime. However, Iceland eventually agreed that it was too important for the strategic security of the North Atlantic and, in 1951, concluded a defense agreement with the US to station troops on the island for the defense of Iceland and the surrounding seas. Iceland is also protected through its membership in NATO and based on recent European Union (EU) and NATO initiatives, it will gain further security benefits from the EU (STRATFOR 2000, 2).

This situation required the merger of two sets of circumstances. The country that needs defending would need to be less concerned about its sovereignty than it is with security threats, and the country providing the troops needs to continue to find the area of sufficient strategic importance to justify the cost. The extent to which these circumstances would apply to Jamaica is discussed in chapter 4.

The Eastern Caribbean States

The islands of the Eastern Caribbean and their approach to national security probably provide a better case study for comparison with Jamaica than the other countries being considered. They are faced with essentially the same regional issues as is Jamaica; they are smaller,¹ have even less resources than Jamaica, and the interest of the international community is likely to be similar in both cases.

Historical Setting

The countries of the Eastern Caribbean are located along a roughly north-south arc where the Caribbean Sea meets the Atlantic Ocean between Puerto Rico and Venezuela, as shown in figure 4. Between 1492 and 1600 various European countries, led by Spain, claimed the islands of the Caribbean, effectively eliminating the Arawakan speaking Indians who populated the islands, such as the Tainos and Caribs (Skidmore and Smith 2001, 289). In the mid to late twentieth century, a number of these Caribbean Islands, primarily the colonies of the UK, gained independence and had to consider the issue of providing for their national security.

It was immediately obvious that most of these islands were just too small to provide any effective security for themselves. The first attempt at collaboration came in the form of the West Indies Federation in 1958, which included not just the English-speaking islands of the Eastern Caribbean, but also the larger islands Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The British-trained New West India Regiment was to serve as the defense force for the shortlived federation. After the union failed, within four years, an attempt was made to form a smaller federation with just the English-speaking Eastern Caribbean islands. However, this also failed as Barbados got its independence in 1966.



Figure 4. Map of the Eastern Caribbean Countries. *Source: World Sites Atlas* (document online, available at <http://www.sitesatlas.com/Maps/Maps/309.htm>, 2000).

Structure of the Security Forces

Still concerned with the security vulnerability due to their small size, the remaining countries of the Eastern Caribbean formed the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) in 1981, with a provision for collective defense. In 1982, Barbados joined with the OECS countries to lead the establishment of the Regional Security System (RSS), encouraged and assisted by the UK and US (Granger 1998, 67).

The Eastern Caribbean states have valid security concerns. Coups with different degrees of success were attempted both in OECS countries, such as Grenada and Dominica, and in neighboring countries such as Jamaica² and Trinidad and Tobago (Library of Congress 1987). There is also the threat of drug trafficking and criminal infiltration. Granger (1998, 65) also lists attempts at secession as a potential threat.

The RSS consists of a mix of police and Coast Guard with only a few small military elements. It is quite unlikely that they will be able to deal effectively with the

main threats facing the countries, without assistance from the larger Caribbean countries or from outside the region. The strength of the OECS security arrangement is that the countries recognize their individual weaknesses and have sought, through formal means, to achieve some level of collective strengthening. It is also clear from the support given to the RSS, that their greatest benefactors, the US and UK, would much prefer for there to be at least a self-provided first line of defense in the region.

Singapore

Singapore is an island that is just slightly larger than Barbados and less than seven percent of the size of Jamaica. However, it has a population almost twice the size of Jamaica's at 4.5 million and has fewer natural resources than Jamaica, that is, only fishing and deepwater ports. It is located in Southeast Asia between Malaysia and Indonesia, as shown in figure 5. At first glance, one could understandably assume that it would have less capability than Jamaica, except for the population, to provide for its own defense, but that is not the case.



Figure 5. Map of Singapore's location. *Source: World Sites Atlas* (document online, available at <http://www.sitesatlas.com/Maps/Maps/309.htm>, 2000).

Historical Setting

Singapore's population is majority ethnic Chinese but includes Malays and Indians. It became a British trading colony in 1819 after which it joined Malaysia in 1963. It separated from Malaysia within two years and became an independent nation, with a population of approximately 1.5 million. Singapore is now one of the world's most prosperous countries, with strong international trading links, one of the world's busiest ports and with per capita GDP similar to that of the leading nations of Western Europe (*CIA World Factbook* 2002).

Structure of the Security Forces

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense in Singapore, Dr. Tony Tan Keng Yam, is of the view that "a small state like Singapore is vulnerable to the vagaries of the international environment" (Ministry of Defense Singapore 2000, 2). This view recognizes the security implications for Singapore of the triangular relationship between the US, China and Japan, as well as the increasing threat of terrorism and cyber attacks aimed at its economic and social infrastructures. It is a strategic chokepoint and was used by Britain to base its largest naval facility in World War Two, which remained until 1971. New Zealand garrisoned a brigade there almost until the end of the Cold War. It is a Chinese island in a Malay sea and adjoins the world's highest piracy-rate area, the Gulf of Thailand and the Malacca Straits (Ninh 2000). In recognition of these threats and strategic challenges Singapore has a network of security levels including its own active forces, its reserve forces, US support (through facilities and exercises), the UN, the Five Power Defence Arrangement, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (Ministry of Defense Singapore 2000,

20). However, with an awareness that priorities could change at any time, it has spent a lot on providing as much of its own security as it can. It spends up to six percent of its GDP on the armed forces, the largest percentage of the largest GDP in ASEAN (Berry 1997, 44). When the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) was established 35 years ago, it included just two battalions and two boats. Today, it has a triservice force over 350,000 strong (active and reserve) comprising several divisions, several squadrons of multirole fighter aircraft and a fleet of two flotillas and a submarine squadron (Ministry of Defence Singapore 2000, 35). This is based on a conscript system.

When Singapore, after merging briefly with Malaysia, gained its separate independence in August 1965, Jamaica was already independent for three years and had started on the industrialization path seeking to exploit its bauxite and limestone resources. Notwithstanding its small size, relatively large population and lack of natural resources, and the availability of security from larger benefactors, Singapore did not view itself as indefinitely incapable of contributing to its own security. It instead set out on a path of industrialization and commerce to ensure that it could afford to provide a significant portion of its security requirements and could secure itself in the future, in the unlikely event that the present security arrangements should be terminated. Even with its significant achievements to date, it is still striving to make itself even more self sufficient without ignoring the advantages of collaborative efforts.

Conclusion

The countries in the four case studies all have something in common with Jamaica in terms of one or more of size, regional issues, resources, population, history or benefactors. Two of the countries, Costa Rica and Iceland, do not formally provide their

own military forces for their security, whereas in the other two cases, the Eastern Caribbean and Singapore, they make overt provisions for military forces to enhance their security. This variation is represented in the line diagram in figure 6. It shows Iceland at one extreme that provides no military of its own; then Costa Rica that constitutionally has no military, but uses police to execute some military roles; next is the Eastern Caribbean, which has a security system that includes small military forces; and finally Singapore that provides significantly larger armed forces than the others.




Figure 6. Ranking of case study countries by size of own military provided

Where Jamaica ranks on this line diagram is one of the questions addressed in chapter 4, after considering what capabilities are required for the threats identified in chapter 2. This ranking guides the evaluation of the optimal forces required in Jamaica. It should be noted also that in all the cases studies some type of provision is made for traditional and/or emerging military roles to be covered.

¹Five of the countries of the Eastern Caribbean are among the fifteen smallest independent countries in the world (Rosenberg 2003).

²In the case of Jamaica, the 1980 coup attempt was by low-ranking military personnel that never got beyond the planning stage, as it was discovered and quashed by the Jamaica Defence Force itself.

CHAPTER 4

TOWARD JAMAICA'S OPTIMAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

This chapter considers the capability, including primary equipment, size and training, required for Jamaica to be prepared to address the threats identified in chapter 2. The optimal structure is then considered. A comparative analysis is then presented of the literature-based findings and those of the expert interviews. The aim of this is to see how the preliminary findings compare with the expert opinion. The proposals from the preliminary findings are not directly influenced by the survey results, but they are used to highlight similarities and contrasts, to hopefully leave the reader with a more complete view of the issues.

Correlation of Threats and Capabilities

Chapter 2 examined some internal and external threats to Jamaican national security and concluded that in addition to the widely acknowledged internal threats, there are significant external nonconventional threats, and that conventional military threats, though much less likely, should not be totally ignored. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the categories of threats Jamaica could face and add the main equipment and tactics required to confront the threats, and the organizations with which those capabilities normally exist.

Level of Threat Significance

The estimate of level of significance of a threat is a somewhat subjective attempt to evaluate the risk that it poses to the country and hence the nature of the capability required to counter it. However, these judgments are based on analyses of objective data or assessment of the emerging situation. A threat that is currently affecting the country or

that is imminent is rated as high. One that is not currently affecting the country, but has good probability of occurrence, based on past frequency or the current situational assessment is rated as medium. If the threat is possible, but its occurrence unlikely at this time it is rated as low.

Table 2. Categories of Internal Threats and Required Capabilities

Threat	Level of Significance	Tactics Required	Equipment Required	Organization with Capability
Drug/arms Trafficking and Criminal Insurgency	High	Detection and apprehension or Lethal force	Air, sea and land surveillance assets	Coast Guard, Air Wing and paramilitary police
Noninsurgent Crimes	High	Detection, prevention and apprehension	Nonlethal or short range precision weapons	Police
Civil Disorder	High	Control and detention	Nonlethal or short range precision weapons	Police including paramilitary
Emergency Response	Medium	Rescue, recovery and rehabilitation	Air, sea and land assets	Military and ODPEM

Table 3. Categories of External Threats and Required Capabilities

Threat	Level of Significance	Tactics Required	Equipment Required	Organization with Capability
External Military	Low	Lethal force	Direct and indirect long range weapons of mass effect	Military
Terrorism	Medium	Investigation and apprehension or Lethal force	Short range precision weapons or Long range mass effect	Paramilitary police or military
EEZ Infringement	High	Detection and apprehension	Air, sea and land assets	Coast Guard, Air Wing
Regional Destabilization	Medium	Lethal force	Direct and indirect long range weapons of mass effect	Military

The level of significance ratings that were determined by Harriott are maintained here for those threats he did consider, which includes external militaries, drugs/arms trafficking, noninsurgent crimes and civil disorder.¹ The threats not specifically addressed in Harriott's summarized list (table 4) include terrorism, EEZ infringement, and regional destabilization. The level of significance of the terrorist threat is rated as medium. Jamaica is not faced with a direct terrorist problem at this time; hence it is not rated as high. However, based on the current increased threat of terrorism internationally and our geographical, political and economic proximity to the US in particular, a rating of low would be overly optimistic. EEZ encroachment is rated at a high level of significance based on the frequency of occurrence. Even with the Coast Guard's offshore presence at the southern fishing banks, they are still faced daily with possible attempts at illegal maritime exploitation. The threat of occurrences in the Caribbean region requiring military action is rated as medium. This is based on the events of the recent past to include the coup attempts in Granada, Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago; the current border disputes in Belize, Guyana and Suriname; and the potential leadership crisis in Cuba.

Required Counterthreat Capabilities

Noninsurgent crimes and civil disorder are threats that should be handled normally by nonlethal means and only exceptionally by lethal force (table 2). Normal crime management typically requires investigative and apprehension tactics to prevent or solve crimes. The equipment required should be nonlethal or short range precision weapons such as sidearms. Precision here refers not necessarily to degree of accuracy, but rather to the ability to target an individual. The use of longer range weapons such as rifles should be the exception and the weapons of mass effect such as machine guns and

lethal grenades should almost never be required. Civil disorder should almost always be controlled by nonlethal means. These capabilities normally reside with the police.

At the other end of the spectrum, but which should be equally clear in terms of the required tactics and equipment, is the conventional military threat whether aimed directly at Jamaica or one of its neighbors in the region (table 3). This may require lethal force including direct and indirect mass effect weapons. Indirect fire weapons are those, such as mortar, artillery and naval guns, which do not require direct line of site access to the target. Mass effect refers to the targeting of groups or areas as opposed to specific individuals, which, in addition to the indirect fire weapons include machine guns and grenades for example. These capabilities are normally restricted to military organizations, as even paramilitary police can hardly justify them for any policing roles.

Some of the other threats in tables 2 and 3 are more ambiguous in terms of the tactics and equipment that are appropriate for them. These threats may require different capabilities depending on their particular character at each occurrence or may require a range of capabilities that do not normally reside in one agency of government. A single isolated terrorist act may, for example, be more appropriately dealt with through investigation and apprehension, as was the case in the Oklahoma City bombing incident in the US that resulted in the arrest and trial of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols. On the other hand, terrorism on a larger scale could be seen as justifying the use of mass lethal force as was the case after the terrorist incidents in September 2001 in New York City and Washington, DC. Appropriate responses to terrorism therefore could range from police through paramilitary to military capabilities. One should, if possible, be prepared for the worse case scenario.

The threats that typically require the capabilities that normally reside in more than one government agency are emergency response, EEZ infringement, and drug/arms trafficking. Emergency response normally requires rescue, recovery and rehabilitation efforts that may include a combination of air, sea and land resources. Specific military skills are not necessarily required, but experience has shown that the varied capabilities peculiar to the military are invaluable in dealing with the multifaceted circumstances of a national emergency. The Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM) is the agency with this responsibility in Jamaica. However, it functions more as a coordination agency as it lacks resources except for limited ground transportation and relief supplies. The present military serves as the main resource agency for the ODPEM.

In the cases of EEZ infringement and drug/arms trafficking, detection and apprehension are crucially dependent on air and sea resources, and arrest and prosecution dependent on the police. The air and sea resources may exist independently or may reside with the police, but at the moment in Jamaica they are a part of the military structure. The issue of whether these resources are best left with the military, transferred to the police or made independent is discussed in the next section, which looks at the optimal structure of the security system focusing on the component with military capabilities.

Structural Considerations

The optimal security apparatus for Jamaica is dependent on, among other things, the level of significance of the perceived threats and the capability required to counter each threat. The required capability suggests the type of organization needed while the level of significance of the threat gives an indication of whether the force needs to be

active and employed, active and on immediate-notice standby, or in reserve. Added to those two components must be considerations of the size force that is required. The primary focus will be on the military requirements. The threats that are clearly exclusively the purview of the police will be considered no further, as the detailed structure of the police force is not within the scope of this dissertation. However, the military structure that is discussed here is based on the assumption that its implementation would be accompanied by a restructuring of the police force to enable it to execute all the uniquely police roles without regular dependence on military assistance. The results of the case studies in Chapter 3 also inform the various options available to structure the required components.

External Support

Before considering the size of the components required to counter each threat, it is useful to first examine the extent to which external assistance may be sought and made available. Jamaica is currently not party to any formal alliance or treaty that specifically provides for assistance with the security of the country. However, based on training arrangements, historical ties, and economic and strategic interests, one can make reasonable, though subjective, assumptions about the likely provision of external security assistance. There is often a very thin line between intervention and invasion. However, is one prepared to say that no matter how bad the Jamaican situation, no intervention is acceptable?

There are regular training arrangements with other CARICOM countries, Commonwealth countries primarily the UK and Canada, and the US. Within CARICOM, joint courses are conducted for both officers and enlisted ranks. Additionally, most

CARICOM countries take part in US sponsored exercises focused usually on counter narcotics, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. In addition to these exercises the US facilitates several training courses at all levels. The UK and Canada also facilitate several courses for Jamaican service personnel. This includes the provision of instructors for the Caribbean Junior Command and Staff Course (CJCSC) based in Jamaica and an annual exchange exercise between UK and Jamaican troops. These strong and consistent training arrangements could be seen as indicating commitments in principle to mutual security.

Due to the small size of the country, Jamaica does not necessarily present a significant economic interest outside the Caribbean region. However, the country is of strategic interest to the US in particular. Evidence of this was strongest during the Cold War years, but since the geography has not changed, it is still not in the US national security interest to have an unstable Caribbean region. If for no other reason, the US would like to have friendly governments in the Caribbean to maintain policies that are favorable including the reduction of drug smuggling and illegal immigration. The interest of UK and Canada are primarily historical and maintained through the Commonwealth.

Two cases in the Caribbean region, in Grenada and Haiti, in as many decades, provide an indication of the nature of the external support that Jamaica could expect. In 1983 the Grenadian Prime Minister was assassinated after a coup by his deputy. The US, primarily out of concern about the strong involvement of Cuba, provided 90 percent of 3,300 troops to intervene. Several Caribbean countries, including Jamaica also provided troops. The leadership crisis in Haiti occurred after the Cold War when there would have been less concern about the spread of communism in the region. In this instance, it was a

case of democracy being hijacked by the Haitian Military. The UN Security Council voted in favor of a US led multinational force to restore democracy there. Again the US provided the great majority of the over 15,000 troops that included personnel from the Caribbean, UK and Canada. At the moment, the US and UK are focused on the Middle East, but it is reasonable to assume that they still have an interest in stability in the Caribbean region and that assistance would be provided if needed.

With the availability of external assistance, Jamaica could choose to take full advantage of that and go for the Iceland model of security. That is, to ask one of these benefactor countries to permanently base troops in Jamaica to handle all the security issues requiring military capability. Jamaica has no single official national security strategy document, but an indication of policy can be determined by government actions and statements over time. In 1996 Jamaica and Barbados objected to some aspects of the US proposed joint counternarcotics strategy, the Shiprider agreement, which was seen as having the potential to infringe upon sovereignty (USIA 1997). This objection was raised at the possible risk of the US decertifying Jamaica as country without adequate counternarcotics measures in place. Such decertification could have affected the diplomatic and economic relationship between Jamaica and the US. The Shiprider negotiation is a strong indicator of the importance of sovereignty to the Jamaica government and hence for restrictions on foreign military presence in Jamaica even when the country needs help. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the government would find the Iceland model unacceptable. All the other case studies in chapter 3 revealed some mix of a provision for their own security as well as for external assistance when the level of the threat exceeds the countries' capabilities. Jamaica should consider having

formal security cooperation treaties/alliances, starting in the Caribbean region, which does not necessarily involve troops being based in country. The security model of the Eastern Caribbean states could be examined in more detail towards this end, but that is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

If Jamaica is not going to invite foreign troops to establish bases in country then there should be provisions for dealing with the threats categorized as having a medium or high level of significance. That would exclude only the external military threat. Yet even in that case, with no foreign troops prepositioned in country, Jamaica would be well advised to have available a first line of defense that can be implemented pending the arrival of external assistance. It is also useful to the military force providing assistance to have locally based troops with intimate knowledge of the theatre of conflict available to provide guidance.

The Size of Each Component Required

Jamaica should require more counter threat capability than the Eastern Caribbean countries, but significantly less than Singapore provides for itself. The most highly rated threats that were deemed to require some capability now resident with the Jamaican military are EEZ infringement and drug/arms trafficking. Both these threats require air and sea assets beyond what are now at the disposal of the Jamaican military. In personal communications with the recently appointed Commanding Officers of the JDF Air Wing and JDF Coast Guard, it was determined that the Air Wing needs, among other assets, three aircraft capable of long range and long endurance surveillance and a total personnel complement of at least 250. In order to provide moderate coverage of Jamaica's waters to the north and south of the island, the Coast Guard needs, in addition to other equipment,

five offshore patrol vessels. A total personnel complement of 460 would be required to man the offshore and inshore vessels as well as the various coastal stations around the island and at the country's main fishing bank, the Pedro Banks.

The threats that were deemed to have medium levels of significance, emergency response, regional destabilization and terrorism, would require ground troops, but would not need a large active component. One battalion, of approximately 600 soldiers, could provide an adequate immediate response to these threats if there were sufficient reserve forces available to be activated as necessary. This battalion should ideally be trained as marines. Being an island nation, any movement outside of the country has to be by air or sea. More significantly, in national emergencies precipitated by hurricanes and or floods, movement by ground within the country is often severely restricted. Marines would retain the capabilities of the present light infantry battalions in Jamaica, but would add more training and competence in operating by air and sea.

The reserve component would have to be of sufficient numbers to provide an adequate response to situations that exceed the capabilities of the one active battalion. In past cases of islandwide emergencies, the full deployment of the existing three infantry battalions was found to be inadequate and could not have been sustained for any extended period. Based on an assessment of these past inadequacies a reserve force of at least four battalions would be needed. This would allow the allocation of a battalion to three or four parishes and facilitate islandwide coverage. Jamaica has an area of just over 10,000 square kilometers and is divided into 14 parishes. This four-battalion reserve could also serve as the first line of defense in the unlikely event of external military aggression. So in fact, although an argument was made for the possibility of external military aggression

to not be totally dismissed, recognition of this probable threat does not add to the size of the total forces that are recommended as optimal for Jamaica. What it does affect is the internal structure and capabilities of this reserve force. If the reserves are to be prepared to oppose conventional military forces, whether in Jamaica or elsewhere in the region, they would need longer range indirect fire weapons than the mortars that now exists in the Jamaican military inventory. To support the brigade sized reserve, a battery of at least four artillery guns is recommended.

Options for the Structure of the Forces

The discussion in the previous section leads to the conclusion that, in terms of capability, Jamaica could do well with only one active marine infantry battalion, a larger Coast Guard and Air Wing, and a reserve brigade of four infantry battalions and an artillery battery. These forces would also need logistic, engineer and intelligence support that could be achieved with only minor restructuring of the existing units with these roles. However, the way these various components should fit within the overall Jamaican security structure is still unanswered. The options considered here are; a single security force encompassing all capabilities; a force that excludes the air and sea assets, which would be controlled by an independent coast guard; and the status quo of separate military and police entities.

One Security Force

Having one security force could take a few different forms, chief of which are: a force that encompasses all the necessary capabilities of the military and the police, or a force that primarily retains the character of one of the existing forces and minimizes the characteristics of the other. If the latter case was to be effected, then it is the police force

that would need to remain active to the detriment of the military. Whereas the need for military capabilities is debatable, the need for the management of law and order is not. In examining the constitutional changes in the Costa Rican constitution, as discussed in Chapter 3, one initially got the impression that the goal of the government was just that, the elimination of the military. However, in examining the actual structure, roles and training of the Costa Rican police forces, it was seen that they do in fact retain significant military functions and capabilities. This method of contrasting designation and employment can lead to exclusion from participation in training and aid programs internationally. As mentioned previously, the US Congress had to make exceptions and exemptions in order to allow the Costa Rican police to benefit from military assistance and training which they need, but which is not normally available to the police.

For a one-force policy to be effective, without being unnecessarily misleading and disadvantageous, it would need to clearly incorporate distinct military and police substructures. The advantage of such a structure would be the retention of all the necessary military and police capabilities, the ability to take advantage of training opportunities relevant to the different arms, and, most important for the tax payers, it could represent cost savings in terms of administration, logistics, infrastructure and other redundant support elements. It is not clear that there would be any savings in terms of personnel overall since, based on the frequency and extent to which the police seek military assistance, it could be that they are understaffed and the combined numbers of personnel from both forces may be just adequate. The main disadvantage of this option is the increased vulnerability of Jamaica's democratic institution to subversion. The Report of the National Task Force on Crime in Jamaica, in considering a merger of the two

forces, expresses the view that “a bipolar distribution of coercive authority is a safer guarantee against challenges to the constituted government” (Wolfe 1993, 24). There is also the issue of the different laws and contractual arrangements that govern the service of the personnel in the two forces. One example is the unionization of the police personnel which effectively allows them to take industrial action in cases of disputes with the government. How would a change of these employment arrangements in either direction affect the character and employability of the personnel of each component? These issues would need adequate examination and resolution before this option is given serious consideration, but is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Police and Independent Coast Guard with Air Assets

The analysis of the threats faced by Jamaica suggest that the ones that were deemed to have high levels of significance were those that require either police capabilities, in the case of noninsurgent crimes and civil disorder, or primarily sea and air assets, in the case of drug/arms trafficking and EEZ infringement. If this led one to the view that only the Coast Guard and Air Wing of the present military need to be permanently active, then they could be merged as an independent Coast Guard with air assets. The police would remain a separate entity and the remainder of the necessary military capabilities would be divested to the reserve force. Several countries, including the US, have this structure of a Coast Guard organized distinctly from the police or military. One disadvantage of this option is that it lacks the marine infantry battalion that was analyzed as being necessary for immediate response while the reserves are being activated. Of course this battalion could be integrated into the Coast Guard especially as

marines. However, once all the necessary support elements are added, the result would be the same military structure proposed in the full two forces option in the next subsection.

Separate Military and Police Forces

The final option considered is closer to the status quo, that is, having separate police and military forces with all the necessary military assets including the reserves under one military command structure. What would distinguish this option from the status quo is the conclusion drawn from the discussion on the required size of each component. That is, only one active marine infantry battalion, a larger Coast Guard and Air Wing, and a reserve brigade of four battalions as opposed to the single large battalion that now exists (see figure 7, appendix E for the proposed structure). In order to make it feasible for the military to function with only one active marine infantry battalion, the police would also need to be restructured, probably with increased numbers, to ensure that they can handle the typical policing roles without resort to the military. If, for example, the military had to consistently provide the ground troops, in addition to air and sea resources, for counter drug/arms trafficking operations, then one active battalion may be insufficient. The main advantage of this option is that it allows each force to maintain its distinct character and it provides more safeguards for the democratic institutions in Jamaica. The value of this should not be underestimated and therefore this option is probably the optimal structure for Jamaica's security.

Analysis of Expert Opinions

The interviews of both military and nonmilitary experts in Jamaican security issues provide an opportunity for comparison and contrast with the findings. This allows the opportunity to see whether there are issues that were not examined in the initial

analysis and to see to what extent a consensus on the way forward can be developed from both sets of data. References to military (MIL) experts apply to senior officers serving the Jamaican military at the time of the interviews. Nonmilitary (NONMIL) refers to experts outside of the Jamaican military, such as senior personnel in government ministries and embassies in Jamaica. The data collection methodology was the questionnaire format and qualitative analyses determined the central tendency of each group's response to each question. The more detailed methodology is presented at appendix B. The questionnaire consists of 15 questions that in addition to personal background information, sought to examine four main issues; the relevance of a military force in Jamaica, its affordability, threats/roles that require military capability, and the ideal structure of the Jamaican security apparatus. The full questionnaire is at appendix C. The aim was to get 10 participants from each group. In the final analysis there were nine MIL and six NONMIL respondents.

Relevance of the Jamaican Military

The overwhelming consensus was that the Jamaican military is relevant locally, regionally and internationally (table 5, appendix D). All the informants in both groups agreed on the local and regional relevance, and only one informant (from the NONMIL group) of the fifteen, suggested that it was not relevant internationally. That individual gave as the reason the fact that Jamaica "has not participated in [military] actions outside the region for more than 25 years."² Among the supporting comments given for the local relevance were sovereignty, government-friendly terms of employment, and its multifaceted response capability not resident in any other organization. Regarding the regional relevance, there were comments such as no other government organization exists

that can contribute as much to regional stability as the Jamaican military, Jamaica is expected to take a leading role in regional security issues, and Jamaica should have the capacity to respond to requests for assistance from neighboring countries. Supporting the view of international relevance were comments like: it gives the government the option of international participation in UN missions, it allows the country to contribute to world stability and peace, and it provides some degree of confidence to foreign interests. These views of the relevance of the Jamaican military compare favorably with the position maintained in this dissertation.

Affordability of the Military

All the interviewees in both groups were of the view that Jamaica cannot socially/strategically afford to not have a military force. It is also the overwhelming, though not unanimous, view that Jamaica can economically afford a military force (table 6, appendix D). One person from each group thought otherwise. One reason given for this view was that the “fiscal reality in Jamaica suggest[s] that vital resources such as the JDF continue to take a back seat to debt repayment.” Comments supporting the majority views were that historically the military has been funded and has provided invaluable service, that funding the military is a necessary investment/insurance, and that there is no doubt that the military can be afforded, but the size and shape of it should be more aligned with affordability. This is a valid observation, but the danger with this approach is that there are always arguments for spending less and of greater needs elsewhere. In keeping with the capabilities-based approach taken in this dissertation, the cocktail of capabilities required to respond to likely and unknown threats should be set as the benchmark for which the country strives, even if it falls short more frequently than not. It should always

be emphasized that the identified capabilities are necessary and the government should be encouraged to continuously strive to achieve them.

Security Threats and Military Roles

In order to get an impression of the experts' views on the capabilities that are required for Jamaica's security, an open-ended question was asked regarding threats to the military and a question with a variety of possible roles to select from was given. In the latter question the respondents could also include additional roles as they saw fit. For the open-ended threat question, both groups identified narcotics trafficking and terrorism as the main threats (table 7, appendix D). They differed on the other significant threats with the MIL group selecting internal security issues and national emergencies, while the NONMIL group saw finance and maritime border security as next in significance. The only one of these threats not identified in the threat assessment section above is finance. Financial considerations in fact present serious challenges to all government organizations in Jamaica, but they were not viewed as falling in the same category as threats that military capabilities are required to combat.

As it was for the determination of the main threats, the two groups basically agreed on the main roles of the ideal Jamaican military organization. Within their top five, four of roles they selected were the same, namely, maritime security, emergency response, defense against nonconventional threats like terrorism, and internal security (table 8, appendix D). The two on which they did not agree in the top five are maintenance of law and order, selected by the MIL group, and ceremonials, chosen by the NONMIL group. With the exception of ceremonials, the top roles chosen by the experts correspond with some of the required capabilities that were identified in the

second section of this chapter. The ceremonial role is indeed an important function of the present Jamaican military, but it is not considered as a capability of sufficient significance to contribute to the determination of the nature of the security structure in Jamaica. Most uniformed groups, with adequate training, would be able to perform ceremonial functions.

Security Structure Issues

Three questions were asked to get an impression of the experts' views on the optimal security structure for Jamaica. They addressed the military capabilities of various nonmilitary organizations, the perceived ideal military organization and the preferred single-force structure. The two groups basically agreed on the first question of what organization(s) would be responsible for the identified roles if there was no military. Both groups unanimously selected the police as having to adopt some traditional military roles in an environment with no military, and equally consistent was the view that the police could not by themselves handle all the military roles (table 9, appendix D). Four other types of organizations, including external forces, were identified as being necessary to cover the full spectrum of traditional military roles.

The groups also agreed in principle on the structure of the ideal military in Jamaica. All except one of the NONMIL respondents were of the view that the military should either be increased in size or remain the same size, but with internal restructuring (table 10, appendix D). The one NONMIL informant who thought the size of the force should be reduced overall offered as an explanation the view that the existing structure was "about right", but the "organization could be streamlined with noncore functions being outsourced." The capabilities assessment that was done determined that the active

force could be structurally reduced to include just one infantry battalion. However, the required increase in the size of the Coast Guard and Air Wing would absorb most of those personnel slots; therefore the overall reduction of the active force would not be significant. The proposal also calls for a significant increase in the size of the reserves. Only two informants from each group specifically suggested an increase in the reserve force accompanying their proposed reduction of the active force.

The final question was the one that had the widest variation in responses both within each group and between groups. This concerned the structure of a single force if there could only be one. Forty-five percent of the MIL group thought that the single force should be primarily military with added police functions, while 50 percent of the NONMIL group thought the opposite should be the case (table 11, appendix D). The next significant selection was 33 percent of the military group that thought that even within one governing body the two forces should maintain their separate identities. This option was also discussed in the structural considerations sections of this chapter.

¹Harriott distinguishes between various components of civil disorder, such as social violence, political conflicts and mass demonstrations/riots. He determined a rating of "very low" for external military aggression, which appears to be necessary for him to distinguish it from the rating of "low" he assigned to food security. Food security is not considered as a distinct threat in this dissertation and therefore that fine separation of the ratings is not required (2002, 6).

²It should be noted that Jamaica's participation in the Haitian intervention in 1994 was for the most part under a UN mandate. It is not uncommon for countries to be asked by the UN to contribute troops to missions in their region. One could ask if it does not require some degree of recognition of relevance internationally for an international organization to so request.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUDING DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Whatever you can't defend doesn't belong to you. (2000, 42)

Chong Yu Meng, *Defending Singapore in the 21st Century*

The above quote started this quest at the beginning of chapter 1. Now that the issues have been examined, it is possible to better put this profound statement into the Jamaican context. “Jamaica is a sovereign country.” “Jamaica belongs to Jamaicans.” These are regularly uttered statements. However, often the same persons who utter those very patriotic statements also argue that, since they see no obvious conventional external threat, there is no need to bear the expense of having a military or that at best there should be only a very small regular/active element. The problem with this type of argument is that the fact that there is no obvious conventional external threat does not guarantee that one may not arise. Even if it did so guarantee, conventional threats are not the only security concerns that face a country. So the question is, if Jamaicans will not make arrangements for the defense of Jamaica, then are statements like “Jamaica belongs to Jamaicans” and “Jamaica is sovereign” any more than just rhetoric?

The interplay and interrelatedness of the Jamaican political, geographic and economic status, plus the international realities of the world we live in create a tapestry of issues and concerns regarding the relevance and optimal structure of a Jamaican Military force. The fact that 60 percent of the budget is at present being used to service debt and that there are no magical economic genies in sight, makes this issue even more complex. This dissertation could not address all the aspects of this dilemma, but since Jamaica is

not isolated from the world, then the security situation in and around Jamaica is as good a place as any to start the process.

The issue then should not be whether Jamaica faces threats to its security internally and externally that require military capabilities. The point, rather, is that the world is not static and the threat that is not there today may arise without warning tomorrow. What has Jamaica learned from the September 2001 attack on the US? The reality, however, is that having decided that Jamaica must arrange for its protection, it is necessary to follow some process to decide how this can best be done. Making arrangements for security does not necessarily mean that Jamaica has to be able to do it all alone. That is clearly not practical. What it does mean is that if Jamaica is sovereign it must make some contribution to its own security and must have clear contingencies in place to cover the gap that the country cannot fill. The necessary process to decide how this is optimally done must start by looking at the known and likely threats and determine required capabilities to respond to and mitigate the effects of the known and unknown.

The Security Environment

A capabilities-based approach was used in the study of the current security environment as opposed to a threat-based approach. So instead of trying to identify the nature and capabilities of a specific enemy and preparing for that, several potential threats were considered with a view to determining what general capabilities are required to face these and yet unknown threats. The US was complacent for decades thinking that no one would dare attack the homeland of the most powerful country in the world. As a result, it was caught off guard by the events of 11 September 2001. The US is now spending

billions to reorganize its security system with significant attention and resources being dedicated to “homeland security.”

The security situation for Jamaica is almost directly opposite, having almost no offensive and quite insignificant defensive military capabilities. However, if, based on the apparent lack of traditional forms of threat, Jamaica fails to prepare, the result might be even more devastating. Should it take an actual attack for Jamaica to focus on its defense? When it is said that Jamaica has no external threat, it can only be referring to conventional military threats. As was argued in this paper, such a view is at least shortsighted and maybe even irresponsible. Jamaica does face external threats that, at a minimum, include terrorism, regional destabilization and EEZ infringement. The internal threats of drug/arms trafficking, criminal insurgency, situations requiring emergency response, noninsurgent crimes and civil disorder, were also considered in determining the required capabilities for the security of the country. Jamaica also provides a first line of defense against threats, like drug trafficking, that are aimed at other destinations like the US. These threats and their link to military capabilities in most cases, make the Jamaican military continue to be relevant, though somewhat structurally inadequate.

Case Studies

The case studies resulted in a range being established for the extent to which each of the countries provided its own military capabilities (figure 6). Iceland provides no military of its own; Costa Rica provides forces with limited military capabilities, but they are designated police; and the Eastern Caribbean countries have a security alliance that provides limited military capabilities. On the other hand, Singapore’s external threat perception and economic means are much higher than those of the other countries

studied. However, even with this wide range, the evidence suggests that provisions are made for military capabilities to be covered by some means in all cases.

Jamaica requires more military capabilities than is available to the Eastern Caribbean countries, but significantly less than that available to Singapore, in terms of the relative threat perception and economic means. In terms of a model, Jamaica is unlikely to adopt that of Iceland, of having foreign bases established for its defense, as the issue of sovereignty is very significant to Jamaicans. The Costa Rican model of one force with military and police roles is attractive, but it does not easily allow Jamaica to retain the present balance of two armed forces, which is considered important for the protection of the democratic institutions.

Capabilities and Structure

Drug/arms trafficking, EEZ infringement, noninsurgent crimes and civil disorder were deemed to have a high level of significance. The latter two were deemed to require capabilities that are the purview of the police. Terrorism, emergency response and regional destabilization were seen as being of medium significance. Finally, the risk of external military threat was rated as low. The appropriate response for terrorism could range from police to military capabilities, but one should, if possible, be prepared for the worse case scenario. EEZ infringement, emergency response, and drug/arms trafficking are crucially dependent on air and sea resources, with adequate support from ground troops.

The Air Wing needs, among other assets, three aircraft capable of long range and long endurance surveillance and a 250-person manning. The Coast Guard needs, in addition to other resources, three to five offshore patrol vessels and a total of 460 persons

in order to provide moderate coverage of Jamaica's waters to the north and south of the island. For the ground requirement, one regular/active marine-trained infantry battalion should be sufficient to provide for immediate response pending the reserve being activated, assuming that the police would also be restructured to not need routine military assistance. This battalion would be highly trained encompassing the widest range of currently accessible military skills including parachuting, infiltration, survival and urban operations. The reserve recommended would optimally consist of a brigade of four infantry battalions. With the present force of three infantry battalions in total, it has been very challenging for Jamaica to deal with national emergency situations in the recent past. If possible, the reserve element should include a battery of artillery guns to provide an adequate delaying action against a conventional military force, unlikely though it may be, whether in Jamaica or facing one of its neighbors.

The results of the expert interviews very closely match the results obtained through analysis. The only area of inconsistency was the issue of what would be the most appropriate structure if there was to be a single force. The views were split with the military and nonmilitary persons favoring military and police structures, respectively. It was concluded that the best compromise structure for a single force would be one that allows the unique characteristics of each force to be maintained. However, the restructuring option that was found to be optimal, and is recommended, is for two separate forces with the police adequately equipped to not require regular assistance from the military.

A review of the security structure of Jamaica cannot be complete without consideration of the other components of the tapestry of issues, particularly the economic,

which probably contributes to many of the security concerns. That is beyond the scope of this dissertation and should be the subject of future research. However, enough information has been provided to demonstrate that expenditure on military capabilities should not be excluded from the budget, however small it may be.

Jamaica requires some formal military capability. The optimal structure is to have a military, separate from the police, with one active infantry battalion that is marine trained, and a larger Coast Guard and Air Wing (figure 7, appendix E). However, if the military is to retain primary responsibility for combating drug and arms trafficking then one active battalion may be insufficient. The reserve would consist of a brigade of four battalions, with responsibility for three or four parishes each. Formal alliances should then be found to handle security issues that are beyond the country's capabilities. The US misinterpreted the emerging geo-security environment and was caught unprepared for attacks on its homeland. This should serve as a warning that if Jamaica chooses to be complacent about national security, it does so at its peril.

APPENDIX A

LITERATURE REVIEW ELABORATED

There are several publications addressing the issue of Caribbean Regional security in the current and emerging situation of an evolving and mutating threat. These include past MMAS theses such as those of Dillon (2001) and Bishop (2002). However, as mentioned in the initial introductory comments, most of the debate on the relevance of the military in Jamaica has been informal. The majority of the security-related publications in Jamaica are on internal security related issues and the employment of the police, the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). Some of these publications indirectly address the issue of the role of the military. One that went far enough to suggest a role and structure of the military is a study by University of the West Indies professor, Anthony Harriott.

After examining the various issues faced by the security forces, but the JCF in particular, Harriott (2002) suggested that Jamaica would be better served by having a larger constabulary force and a significantly smaller professional military force as the core of a National Guard of reservists. He is of the view that the applicable military roles are basically limited to internal security and emergency management. He thinks a stronger police force will be able to deal with most internal security issues and a small reserve military force is sufficient to act on emergency management issues. This was based on his categorization of the threats he saw affecting Jamaica, which are presented in table 4. As mentioned in chapter 1, Harriott's focus was on a more effective constabulary force and therefore he probably did not consider the precise structural

adjustments that the required military capabilities would imply. He also appears to have been misinformed on the size of the present regular/active force in Jamaica. His quote of 4,500 is 50 percent more than the actual figure. That probably explains his conclusion that the active military is excessive large for Jamaica's circumstances. However, his work is perceived as giving credibility to similar positions taken in the informal debates.

Table 4. Harriott's Categorization of Threats to Jamaican Security

Threat	Category	Level	Response agency
External aggression/territorial integrity	military	very low	military
Natural disasters	civil defense	medium	military\ODP
Human environmental damage	criminal\civil	high	police
Drug\arms trafficking	criminal	high	police\coast guard
Food security	economic\health	low	customs\MOH
Political conflicts	political\criminal	medium	general and para-military police
Mass demonstrative actions\riots	political\criminal	high	general and paramilitary police
Social violence and ordinary crimes	criminal	high	general police

Source: Anthony Harriott, "Mission Effectiveness, Environmental Change and the Reconfiguration of the Jamaican Security Forces," *Security and Defence Studies Review* 2, no. 1 (summer 2002): 27.

Note:

ODP is the Office of Disaster Preparedness,
MOH is the Ministry of Health.

Major Geoff Roper (2001), writing for his MA at Kings College London, examined the viability of combining military and constabulary (police) forces in small developing states. He considers a number of arguments for and against such a merger. In support of a single force he cites the effects of the end of the Cold War era. He argues

that there is no longer an external threat to small countries like Jamaica, which makes a dedicated military unnecessary. Linked to this observation is the significant economic benefit there would be to running only one security force in light of the poor state of the economy in Jamaica. Over 60 sixty percent of the national budget goes toward debt repayment. He sees a combined force as being more effective in maintaining law and order. He also thinks that a merger of the two forces would reduce perceived “widespread” corruption in the police force. It would be an opportunity, he says, to get rid of the “bad eggs.”

In discussing arguments for maintaining separate police and military forces, Roper outlines the need for the military to be available to provide essential services in the event of industrial action, such as strikes, or natural disasters. However, his main concern is that the probability of a coup d'etat occurring may increase because there are no significant checks and balances on the use of force within the state (see also Wolfe 1993, 24). He concludes that although there is much to be gained economically by amalgamation there is also much potential for stability to be lost by such a move. His concern with stability relates to, among other things, the issue of the police themselves taking action that may affect national security.

Roper's examination of the issues was quite effective in that although he obviously opposes the amalgamation of the police and the military, he thoroughly considered not just evidence in support of this position but also significant evidence supporting amalgamation of the forces. However, he only considered one alternative to the existing military structure, that of a merger of the police and the military. In order to draw conclusions regarding the relevance and appropriate structure of any necessary

military force one needs to look at what military roles are currently applicable for the country and examine several options for the execution of these roles. An examination of the security factors affecting Jamaica at the moment and in the future, followed by an objective look at various means of preparation for necessary roles, is presented.

APPENDIX B

METHODOLOGICAL DETAILS

Overview

The research was conducted primarily through qualitative content analyses of evidence in the literature that could provide answers to the primary and subordinate research questions. Related issues affecting Jamaica internally, regionally and internationally were considered. Chapter 3 also examines the approach other similar small states take regarding similar issues in the form of case studies. Secondary support for the findings of the research was sought from selected experts and specialists in Jamaican security and strategic issues, to include senior officials in the military, government and a few embassies in Jamaica.

Data Collection Plan

The data for the content analysis was obtained primarily from library and Internet resources. There is a distinction between the literature review and this portion of the data sourcing. The literature review is focused on publications that contribute to an understanding of the general background that led to the formulation of the research questions. The data for the content analysis was primarily focused on information that can contribute to the provision of answers to the specific research questions. In this regard the data will not be restricted to those specifically addressing issues that obviously directly affect Jamaica. Even before the present extent of globalization it would have been reasonable to assume that countries cannot effectively function in isolation. It should be even more relevant now.

The supporting data of expert opinion was collected utilizing a survey questionnaire designed to provide a selection of possible answers, but also with a provision for the interviewees' own options or comments. The decision to limit the supporting data source to selected experts is based on two considerations. First, the issues of strategic threat, human and material requirements, and treaty obligations may not be sufficiently appreciated by the general population to lead to relevant and applicable conclusions regarding military requirements and structure. Second, the limitations on this research project does not allow for the collection and analysis of data from a representative sample of the Jamaican population.

The targeted informants include on the one hand military personnel, primarily senior officers, and Government representatives with responsibility for the military, and on the other hand persons from outside of the direct Jamaican military chain of command. This latter group consists of persons with expert knowledge of strategic and security issues, such as the police, embassy representatives with security/strategic portfolios, opposition party representatives and a university professor. A total of twenty informants were targeted, including ten Jamaican military (MIL) representatives and ten non-Jamaican military informants (NONMIL). Responses were received from nine MIL and six NONMIL informants.

The questionnaire is presented at appendix C. The first four questions are designed to gather information about the informants to facilitate their categorization. Questions 6 to 8 seek to get the informants' direct opinion on the relevance of a Jamaican Military organization, without referring them to any particular facts. The remaining questions are largely designed to get the informants to give their views on issues that

would more objectively indicate the relevance of the military in Jamaica. These include issues of affordability, roles and structure.

The questionnaire was administered by email, fax or hard copy by mail, depending on the preference of the informant. A cover letter was attached to each questionnaire as presented at appendix C.

Data Analysis Plan

The main analysis took the form of four case analyses of countries with some similar security related issues such as size, strategic location and/or regional considerations. They are Costa Rica, Iceland, the eastern Caribbean States and Singapore. The focus was on how these countries handle the issue of national security in order to determine a suitable model for Jamaica.

The supporting data was organized to present the frequency distribution of the responses to the interview questions. The aim will be to collate the frequency of responses to individual questions. The next step in the analysis process was to determine the central tendency of each group and for all informants. A matrix was designed to compile the analyzed data from the questionnaires. The results of the analysis from the informants are used in a comparative analysis of the results obtained from the evidence in the literature.

Credibility

Several research and statistics manuals address the issue of credibility of data and data analyses. Patton (1990) specifically addresses the issue of the credibility of qualitative research. For qualitative research to be credible it should positively address a number of issues including validity and reliability of the data, and the credibility of the

researcher (Patton 1990, 461). The validity and reliability of the data can also be categorized as internal versus external validity. Internal validity speaks to whether the data collection methodology is likely to yield the information required to address the research. One tool that is available to improve internal validity is triangulation (Denzin 1970, 313). Triangulation basically requires having redundancy in the data collection and analysis processes.

This research applied triangulation at various levels including the data collection method and the data sources. The contrasting yet complimentary methods of literature content sourcing and interviewing were used to address the issue of consistency of findings. For the interviews, two groups with potentially different viewpoints were sourced as a check on the consistency of the sources.

External validity speaks to, amongst other things, the extent to which particular data can be the basis of generalizations. This is particularly challenging for qualitative methods since they normally involve small sample sizes (Patton 1990, 486). For this research, the small sample of informants is not intended to be representative of the Jamaican population or even any of the organizations from which they are drawn. The research questions were answered based largely on the facts of the strategic security situation as it impacts on Jamaica and on the four case studies of other small countries. The data from the interviews are intended to be expert opinions that will be compared and contrasted with the tentative conclusions that emerge from the analysis of the case studies. Any generalizations that are implied should be viewed as hypotheses. As Cronbach (1975, 125) points out, in qualitative research, “when we give proper weight to the local conditions, any generalization is a working hypothesis, not a conclusion.”

The establishment of the credibility of the researcher is more important for qualitative research than it is for quantitative research. This issue is not easily resolved, but the “principle is to report any personal and professional information that may have affected data collection, analysis, and interpretation … of the findings” (Patton 1990, 472). In this case the researcher is an officer of the present Jamaican military organization with personal and professional interest in the survival of some military force in Jamaica. However, this position also represents a positive for the research, as the researcher is thereby equipped with knowledge of issues and sources that were incorporated to adequately address the research questions. In the final analysis, the reader has to decide whether differing points of view were sufficiently explored and whether the evidence so presented supports the thesis.

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE

Cover Letter

.....
.....
.....

November, 2002.

Dear,

Re: Questionnaire on the Relevance and Structure of a Jamaican Military Organization

I am in the process of reading for the Master of Military Arts and Science Degree at the United States Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In partial fulfillment of the requirements for this degree, I am conducting research to determine the relevance of a Jamaican military organization. I will also attempt to determine the structure that would be most appropriate for such a force or whatever other organization would assume the military roles, if such roles were identified.

One component of my data collection plan is to get the opinion of select persons with expert or specialist knowledge of the Jamaican military/strategic situation. The data gathered will be analyzed as expert opinion and not as being representative of your organization. The attached questionnaire is designed to achieve this objective.

The questionnaire consists of five questions seeking information about the respondent and ten questions seeking specific information for the research. Provision is made for you to provide additional comments as necessary. Your name is optional on the questionnaire and, if given, will not be quoted in any publication relating to this research project, but may be used to clarify provided answers if necessary. The questionnaire should take 15 to 30 minutes to complete, depending on the extent of additional comments you wish to provide. The questionnaire should ideally be returned within two weeks of receipt.

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research and I look forward to your response.

Yours sincerely,

Rocky R. Meade
Major

**Questionnaire on the Relevance and Optimal Structure
of a Military Organization in Jamaica**
Study by Major Rocky Meade

Please respond to the following questions by writing in the space provided or selecting an option by placing an X before the selection, unless otherwise specified. Your name is optional, but if entered it will not be published, but used only for clarification of responses if necessary.

1. Name (Optional):(will not be quoted if given)
2. Nationality:
3. Country of Residence:
4. Age:_____
5. Occupation (Select all that apply):
 a. Military
 b. Police
 c. Government
 d. Ex-Military
 e. Other (specify)
6. Is a Jamaican military organization relevant for Jamaica?
 a. Yes
 b. No
 Why?
.....
.....
7. Is a Jamaican military organization relevant for the Caribbean Region?
 a. Yes
 b. No
 Why?
.....
8. Is a Jamaican military organization relevant internationally?
 a. Yes
 b. No
 Why?
.....

9. What is/are the main threat(s) to be faced by any future Jamaican military?

.....
.....
.....

10. Can Jamaica afford (economically) a military organization?

a. Yes
 b. No

Why?

.....
.....

11. Can Jamaica afford (socially/strategically) to not afford a military organization?

a. Yes
 b. No

Why?

.....
.....

12. What would be the roles of the ideal Jamaican military organization? (Indicate by placing number 1 for the most significant role, 2 for the next, etc. Leave blank those you think should be excluded).

a. National defence against conventional external forces.
 b. National defence against nonconventional threat (specify).....
 c. Maritime/Border Security
 d. Internal Security
 e. Nation Building (engineering, etc.)
 f. Nation Building (youth training, etc.)
 g. Emergency Response (search, rescue, evacuate, relief, rehabilitate, etc.)
 h. Maintenance of Law and Order
 i. Ceremonials
 j. Maintenance of Essential Services
 k. Regional Support (assistance, training, etc.)
 l. United Nations Support
 m. Other (specify)

n. Other (specify)

o. Other (specify)

13. If there is to be no Jamaican military organization, which organization(s) would be responsible for the roles in question 12 above? Place the letter(s) corresponding to the role(s) in 12 in the space to the right of the relevant organization below.

a. The police

b. Statutory bodies

c. Nongovernment organization

APPENDIX D
TABLES OF THE SURVEY ANALYSIS

Table 5. The Relevance of a Jamaican Military Organization

Answer	Military Respondents %	Nonmilitary Respondents % (Fraction)
Relevant for Jamaica	100	100
Relevant Regionally	100	100
Relevant Internationally	100	83 (5/6)

Table 6. The Affordability of a Jamaican Military Organization

Answer	Military Respondents % (Fraction)	Nonmilitary Respondents % (Fraction)
Jamaica can afford a military (economically)	89 (8/9)	83 (5/6)
Jamaica cannot afford (socially/strategically) to not have a military	100	100

Table 7. The Main Threats to be faced by the Jamaican Military

Rating of Threat	Military Respondents	Nonmilitary Respondents
1	Narcotics trafficking	Narcotics trafficking
2	Terrorism	Terrorism
3	Internal security issues	Finance
4	National emergencies	Maritime/border threats

Table 8. The Roles of the Ideal Jamaican Military Organization

Rating of Role	Military Respondents	Nonmilitary Respondents
1	Maritime/border security	Emergency response
2	Counter nonconventional threats	Maritime/border security
3	Internal security	Ceremonials
4	Law and order maintenance	Internal security
5	Emergency response	Counter nonconventional threats
6	Counter conventional threats	Law and order maintenance
7	Nation building (youth training, etc.)	Nation building (engineering, etc.)
8	Essential services maintenance (during industrial action, etc.)	Regionally support (assistance, training, etc.)
9	Nation building (engineering, etc.)	Counter conventional threats

Table 9. Organizations that Could Assume Military Roles

Rating of Organization	Military Respondents	Nonmilitary Respondents
1	Police	Police
2	Statutory body	Statutory body
3	Nongovernment organizations	External forces
4	Voluntary organizations	Nongovernment organizations
5	External forces	Voluntary organizations

Table 10. The Ideal Structure of the Jamaican Military

Structure	Military Respondents % (Fraction)	Nonmilitary Respondents % (Fraction)
Existing JDF structure with more personnel	33 (3/9)	50 (3/6)
Marine infantry	33 (3/9)	
Smaller infantry and larger Coast Guard	22 (2/9)	33 (2/6)
Different and larger structure	11 (1/9)	
Existing JDF structure with fewer personnel		17 (1/6)

Table 11. The Structure if there is to be a Single Force

Structure	Military Respondents % (Fraction)	Nonmilitary Respondents % (Fraction)
Military structure with police capabilities added	45 (4/9)	33 (2/6)
Distinct military and police organizations under one headquarters	33 (3/9)	50 (3/6)
Police structure with military capabilities added	22 (2/9)	17 (1/6)

APPENDIX E
PROPOSED JAMAICAN SECURITY STRUCTURE




Figure 7. Proposed Jamaican Security Structure

Notes: Min of NS: Minister of National Security

JCF: Jamaica Constabulary Force

CNS: Chief of the National Security Staff

Silent Battalion: One that is legally established but not manned (see glossary).

PS: Permanent Secretary

JDF: Jamaica Defence Force

GLOSSARY

Battalion. A military organizational unit of approximately 400 to 700 soldiers

Battery. An artillery organizational unit with three to eight main guns

Chief of the National Security Staff. Proposed principal advisor to the Minister of National Security on all technical aspects of national security and operational coordinator of all the country's security establishments.

Commonwealth or Commonwealth of Nations. A loose voluntary association of political entities that give symbolic or actual allegiance to the British crown, or did so at one time. These entities include 51 sovereign nations and several dependencies.

Cold War. A struggle since 1945 between United States led allies and the group of nations led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Direct military conflict did not occur between the two superpowers, but intense economic and diplomatic struggles erupted. It ended in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR.

Flash flooding. The sudden, unpredictable, inundation of an area with flood waters

Flotilla. A Navy organizational unit of two or more squadrons of warship. The Singapore flotilla has three squadrons.

Permanent Secretary. Senior civilian advisor to the Minister and administrative head of their government ministry in Jamaica

Shiprider. A US proposed joint counternarcotics strategy for countering drug trafficking through the Caribbean.

Silent Battalion. One that is legally established but not manned. This allows for the rapid raising of a pre-approved unit, without having to wait on the typically lengthy structure approval process in the Defence Board and/or Parliament.

Statutory body. An organization established by statute to execute government functions but with operational independence similar to private organizations.

Squadron. A military organizational unit. In the Singapore Navy a squadron has six ships as well as supporting aircraft.

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